Government by Greed - PART 5: 1987 - The
Impossible Coup
Guest Writer-Subhash
Appana
A political
coup-de-tat has few civilian parallels in terms of rationale, planning,
logistics, back-up support, follow-up and consequences. In Fiji, the unthinkable
had happened at the April 1987 elections – the carefully camouflaged and
internally inconsistent myth of democratic power in perpetuity was finally
blown. First there was disbelief, then consternation, then
confusion followed by complaining and anger. It is at this point that the
coup-makers stepped in to provide guidance to a relatively small portion of the
country that appeared to be
reeling like a plane without a pilot.
The message that
these saviours brought was not about democracy and the inevitability of changes
in government, but on how the Fijian people were under threat from the greedy,
dishonest and covetous designs of the “kai Idia” or the Indians. This was an
old message that had potent political traction and it became the mantra that
rallied the masses. Local reggae band Rootstrata,
came up with a stirring number about Fijian self-determination, the Fijian way
– ‘o cei o ira (who are they), they sang. There was thus no other way for Fiji
at that juncture.
Rabuka clearly
stated this in his (now oft-questioned) book, “No Other Way”. Of course if the
Fijian leaders, especially the traditional ones had spoken up and stemmed the
tide, coup might have been avoided because the rationale for it would have been
nipped – no disturbance, no need for coup! The problem was, this was very
difficult and it did not leave (or create) room for a re-look at Fiji politics
in order to change it and make it more appropriate to the changing times.
Bavadra & Co were hardly likely to re-think a model that had just brought
them to power.
There was a more
significant development within those orchestrated disturbances that has so far
been given scant notice by analysts of the 1987 coup and Fiji politics. The
framework within which the disturbances were unleashed involved a cadre of
fiery, reactionary, peripheral leaders, who had been agitating for public
recognition, as front men. Behind this frontline was a group of shady
“controllers” who, in turn, were following directives from a high command. The
public only got to see the “faces” and has continued to speculate about the
“non-faces”.
More importantly, at
some stage the rebellion acquired a momentum and direction of its own. The
front-men, who were supposed to follow directives and exit centre stage when
required, suddenly had too much power, energy and ambition. Taniela Veitata,
Manasa Lasaro, Jona Qio, etc. began to plan and make independent
pronouncements. Those who were supposed to be under control were suddenly out
of control. That’s where the 1987 coup went wrong, and that’s what Fiji is
still reeling from today.
Coming back to the
planning of that coup, the plotters needed backing from a number of quarters.
Firstly, they needed a smattering of lower-level traditional leaders – there
was no shortage of these. Then they needed leaders in an urban setting. And of
necessity, this included peripheral unionists, churchmen and thugs. All those
whose political (and therefore, economic) ambitions had somehow been kept in
check by the Mara government suddenly sprang to centre stage.
This was the
opportunity they had been waiting for and they made the most of it while
chanting the potent mantra of “down with the kai Idia”. Defenders of the Fijian
heritage suddenly sprang up all over the place as the fever took hold and
rebellion gained momentum. Many supporters joined simply for want of nothing
better to do, many were drawn by the power of the preachers and the occasion
that was created. Many thought they were really defending the Fijian heritage.
Many expected fallouts and were already fingering Indian houses that they’d
move into.
That was the nature
of the rebellion that preceded Rabuka’s coup.
A second, more
important concern that troubled the plotters of that coup was what would happen
afterwards. For an orderly transition from the brink of created chaos, they
needed to fall back on Fiji’s main leaders who commanded traditional Fijian
backing – they needed leaders who could control both the masses as well as the
keepers of the law (police and military). This meant they had to have the
support of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau and Ratu Sir George
Cakobau. These three leaders stood at the pinnacle of the Fijian chiefly system
ie. the traditional power structure at that point in time.
The original Coup-maker-Sitiveni Rabuka, who has now gone into oblivion, and the coup culture he opened up in 1987 still affects Fiji. |
The Fijian
traditional administrative system that was shaped and fossilized by Governor
Arthur Gordon after cession in 1874 has the country divided into 14 provinces
which are in turn grouped into 3 confederacies – Kubuna, Tovata and Burebasaga.
Each of these confederacies is headed by a paramount chief. In 1987, Kubuna was
headed by ex-Governor General Ratu Sir George Cakobau. Tovata was headed by the
then GG Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau. And Burebasaga was headed by Lady Ro Lala
Mara, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara’s wife.
Ratu Sir Kamisese
Mara was thus not a paramount chief in his own right, but he was the husband of
one. On top of that, he had been groomed for and headed the modern structure of
government that was essentially juxtaposed on the traditional structure.
Moreover, Ratu Mara had been earmarked to lead Fiji by Fiji’s most prominent
colonial-era chief, Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna. In fact it was Ratu Sukuna who played
cupid in helping hitch Mara with the young lass from Burebasaga who would later
become the Roko Tui Dreketi, the paramount chief of Burebasaga.
Former Roko Tui Dreketi, Adi Lady Lala Mara with husband Ratu Sir Kamiseses Mara. It is said that it was Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna who was instrumental in helping Ratu Mara wed Adi Laldy Lala Mara. |
The coup plotters of 1987 had to prepare to contend with the expected fallout after Rabuka executed his Treason at 10. Fiji would be rudderless and leaderless amid the vacuum that would be created by removing the Bavadra government. The trouble-makers were mainly urban Fijians who had been harnessed for the disturbances. They could be controlled by their newly-created leaders up to a certain extent only. The main source of stability had to come from traditional sources – the paramount chiefs.
And the 1987 coup did have either explicit or implicit
support from this all-important source as without military and chiefly support
a political coup-de-tat was not possible in Fiji at that point in time.
Next, how could this be true? Keep tuned, coming in
Part 6:
“…….. force and
violence are necessary complements of any coup-de-tat. And in order to “build”
the scenario to justify a coup, an orchestrated process is activated. The aim
is to create a situation that allows a treasonous, yet quietly-supported,
coup-maker to say “there was no other way”. This is exactly what happened in
Fiji, and that is exactly what Rabuka said after he executed the Father of All
Coups on 14th May 1987. The common thread that bound all who
supported that coup was the perceived need to protect the Fijian heritage and
save the Fijian race from Indo-Fijians.
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[About
the Author: Subhash Appana is an
Indo-Fijian academic with Fijian family links. He was brought up in the chiefly village of
Vuna in Taveuni and is particularly fond of the Fijian language and culture.
Subhash has written extensively on the link between the politics of the vanua,
Indo-Fijian aspirations and the continued search for a functioning democracy in
Fiji. This series attempts to be both informative and provocative keeping in
mind the delicate, distractive and often destructive sensitivities involved in
cross-cultural discourses of this type.]