Government by Greed: Part 3 – Power in
Perpetuity or Coup
By Guest Writer
Subhash Appana
It is no secret that the
architects of the 1970 constitution, apart from the Indian delegation,
envisaged power in perpetuity for the Fijian Establishment-backed Alliance
Party of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara…..
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| RATU SIR KAMISESE MARA- Fiji's first Prime Minister from 1970 -1987, when after 17 years of Alliance rule, the 1970 Constitution , all of a sudden was found lacking, when his Alliance Party lost the election. That Constitution was deemed good as long as the Eastern Chiefs ruled Fiji. |
Democracy in Fiji was thus meant to ensure power in perpetuity
to the Alliance Party and no one could really expect any different for the
country. The role of the military as a protector of this shakily established
façade of democracy was therefore, always open to revolutionary introspection –
Rabuka’s coup should not have been such a big surprise.
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Power in
Perpetuity or Coup
It has been contended here that in the initial post-1970
scheme of governance (and politics) in Fiji, the Royal Fiji Military Forces
(RFMF) was supposed to play the usual role of any military in a democracy –
protect the constitution and everything it stood for. The problem arose in
understanding what democracy entailed and what the constitution was supposed to
stand for within a functioning democratic framework.
It
is no secret that the architects of the 1970 constitution, apart from the
Indian delegation, envisaged power in perpetuity for the Fijian
Establishment-backed Alliance Party of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. In
fact many have argued that this would have served Fiji best. I beg to differ -
a benevolent dictatorship with periodic elections to perpetuate the carefully
crafted façade of democracy based on ethnicity would have had limited life at
best in a changing traditional context with a large immigrant community.
But that is not the point of this article; we want to
see how the military’s role was kept hazy for those who could not “see” through
the delirium and euphoria of independence. Firstly there was a direct link
between the military hierarchy and national government – both had Fijian chiefs
amongst a sprinkling of white key personnel. The chiefs at the apex of the chiefly system, and the military and
government had very close blood ties.
Secondly, the electorate was expected to remain divided
along ethnic lines forever. This, coupled with the expectation of a united
Fijian government (with a multi-racial hue), and a bickering Indian opposition,
was supposed to characterize democracy Fiji-style. In the event of any
disruptions to these expectations, the disproportionate number of “Others” in
parliament was expected to hold the balance of power – a powerful trump card
for government.
Democracy
in Fiji was thus meant to ensure power in perpetuity to the Alliance Party and
no one could really expect any different for the country. The role of the
military as a protector of this shakily established façade of democracy was
therefore, always open to revolutionary introspection – Rabuka’s coup should
not have been such a big surprise. The first jolt had already come in April
1977 when the NFP won against all expectations. Adroit constitutional and
political manoeuvring prevented any unwanted fall-out at that stage.
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| A young Brigadier -General Sitiveni Rabuka, who was identified as a tool to ensure continuous rule by Eastern Chiefs through Military intervention, if things did not work the Alliance Party way. Read Part 4 for more on this. |
After 1982, the writing was on the wall and talks began
to emerge of a government of national unity. Political immaturity prevented
this from materializing. In the meantime, a common political platform began to
emerge among the working-classes as the Mara government started implementing
necessary, but unpopular economic policies. One of these, the 1985 wage freeze,
led to the formation of the Fiji Labour Party by Fiji’s main labour unions on 6th
July 1985.
This heralded the arrival of a non-ethnic political
platform in the country that up till then could only envisage politics through
the ethnic lens. There was an expectation within the Fijian Establishment that
democracy was only acceptable so long as it assured power and victory to the
Establishment-backed party at any and every election. This was the Fijian
position on government. And it stemmed from an omission to prepare them for
real democracy and a commission to keep them distrustful of Indians, the main
perceived political threat.
I recall an indicative incident in 1977. The NFP had won
and was poised to form government as Fiji waited on edge. A pall of despondency
and darkness descended on my village, Vuna in Taveuni. Life came to a
standstill and there was much consternation, then confusion, then complaining
among kava drinking. In a trip to the local liquor outlet, the Wainiyaku
Butchery, an inebriated and unhappy chief lamented loudly, “sa oti - all is
lost” to Adrian Tarte of the prominent Tarte family.
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| SUBHASH APPANA, Guest Author for FIJI PUNDIT, was born and bred in the Chiefly village of Vuna in Taveuni. As a young man in 1977, when first Alliance party lost the election, he experience first-hand that indigenous Fijians were not ready for a change in government from the chiefly rule of Eastern Chiefs. |
Adrian’s response, “no, nothing has gone wrong, that’s
the way it is”. After that, there were mutterings as the group moved across the
road from the butchery with boxes of Fiji Bitter. I was only a child then, but
distinctly remember the frills-free emotional outbursts that followed. One
point kept coming through, how could this happen to us! Our country cannot be
ruled by outsiders, this is not right! That was the level of understanding of
democracy that persisted into 1987 as Fiji geared for its most crucial
elections yet.
And as mentioned
earlier, a new phenomenon had entered the political scene in the form of the
multi-racial Fiji Labour Party that espoused a non-ethnic, issues-focused
political platform. Its victory-focused coalition with the Indian-dominated
National Federation Party diluted this somewhat, but the writing was on the
wall. On the other hand, Fijian unity had begun to fray within an outdating
chiefly system as Butadroka pranced on his anti-Mara platform.
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| Once a Deputy Minister in Ratu Mara's Alliance Government, SAKIASI BUTADROKA formed Fijian Nationalist Party, determine to oust Ratu Mara, which he succeeded in doing in 1977 ( half-done) and finished the job with the loss of Alliance in 1987, which, as predicted, resulted in coup. |
When Mara’s Alliance Party finally did lose in April
1987, an unsuspecting Fijian electorate was apparently caught absolutely
unawares. What was not meant to be had happened! The Indians had tricked
Fijians into joining the FLP! Little India in Fiji! How dare they disrespect
chiefs! The Fijians thus were not willing to accept the verdict of the ballot
box. And more importantly, even though Ratu Mara made his famous speech on
“democracy is alive and well in Fiji”, his defeated colleagues rejected the
outcome.
In that silently crackling cauldron all that was
needed was an outlet for Fijian reaction. That’s where Apisai Tora and the Taukei Movement emerged. The first
roadblocks were mounted in Tavua as Emperor Gold Mines decided its business
interests were under threat from a socialist-leaning government. Fiery
ethno-nationalist speeches, hymns, sermons, nationalistic songs, food,
transport and an underlying threat of unmitigated violence became part of an
orchestrated movement against the Bavadra government.
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| APISAI TORA, a natinalist politician, who once was a politician in Indian National Federation Party (NFP), has been instrumental in leading unrest that ultimately resulted in the coups of 1987, as well as 2000. His biggest past-time was organising anti-Indian marches, that tended to cause political instability in Fiji. |
While this was
happening, others had begun to explore the military option to right the wrong
that democracy and an ungrateful, conniving Indian community had dropped on
Fiji. The RFMF’s 3rd-ranking officer was suddenly playing golf on
the same Pacific Harbour course as the defeated PM. More Alliance politicians
had begun to appear openly at Taukei rallies. A drastic solution had to be
found for Fiji. Coup was in the air. [Keep reading]
Stay tuned - Part 4: The Military Card Had
to Be Played
After the 1987 elections, as the
orchestrated rebellion against the verdict of the ballot box became more
strident and violent, a dark silent group began making overtures to the RFMF.
And Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka was identified as the right choice to
execute a coup-de-tat even though he was number 3 in the military hierarchy.
was finally in place: the taukei
marchers, power preachers, escalating and apparently uncontrollable crime and
violence, chiefly withdrawal, US complicity, key business support, and a primed
military goon squad under the command of a committed senior officer. Next stop,
treason at 10. Keep tuned.
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[About
the Author: Subhash Appana is an
Indo-Fijian academic with Fijian family links. He was brought up in the chiefly village of
Vuna in Taveuni and is particularly fond of the Fijian language and culture.
Subhash has written extensively on the link between the politics of the vanua,
Indo-Fijian aspirations and the continued search for a functioning democracy in
Fiji. This series attempts to be both informative and provocative keeping in
mind the delicate, distractive and often destructive sensitivities involved in
cross-cultural discourses of this type.]
